Foreign policy part deux (and this one is quite lengthy, so please forgive me): The events since Wednesday night have re-highlighted the Kenyan policy towards South Sudan, yet ironically made the issue far murkier than it was a week ago.
To recount: Ban Ki-Moon (in what is likely one of the last major decisions in his lackluster tenure as UN Secretary General) agreed with the recommendations of an investigation and sacked Lt. Gen. Johnson Mogoa Kimani Ondieki from his post as Commander of troops of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The investigation was about the occurrences of July 11, when, in a horrific attack, foreign aid workers were gang-raped (one by 15 men), and a journalist, John Gatluak, publicly executed for being from the wrong tribe. The charge against Lt. Gen. Ondieki is that his troops, stationed a kilometre away, did nothing to relieve the situation. Three things to note about the incident and its aftermath: first, some of the soldiers in the attack reportedly wore shoulder patches with tiger insignia, which is typically worn by the presidential guard in SS. Secondly, the attackers reportedly deliberately sought out Americans and taunted them. Third, the troops are under the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of the UN. All these points are important. Keep them in mind as we'll come back to them.
On to the Kenyan response. Very, very rarely in our history have we taken such a stern stance in a diplomatic dispute. Even when we're provoked (for example, Ethiopian troops engaging in incursions into Kenyan territory, and sometimes taking uniformed Kenyan officials hostage), we usually engage in much quieter diplomacy. In this case, though, we dropped a bombshell. The notice we sent to the UN on Wednesday was remarkable in the level of anger we displayed, and the President followed this up yesterday with declamations about how we wouldn't give up our dignity as a nation. Ban's offer to our military to provide Lt. Gen. Ondieki's replacement was rebuffed (he's been temporarily replaced by Chinese Maj. Gen. Chaoying Yang). There are differing opinions as to whether this is justified (Kennedy O. Opalo believes that Kenya is one of the rare countries in Africa with the muscle to stand up to the UN; other observers think we have overreacted).
The thing, though, is that Kenya opted to walk into the mudbath (or more accurately, bloodbath) of South Sudan, and it's unclear how we extricate ourselves with any level of dignity or clarity. A very senior source in the foreign affairs setup in Nairobi told me a while ago that our overarching aim was to avoid opening a second front for instability in Kenya's northwest (adding, obviously, to the mess in the northeast with Somalia). Noble aim, but how we've gone about it has been sub-optimal. While we've worked with regional bodies - the EAC, but especially IGAD - we seem to have acted in a way that is advantageous to one side, without guarantees of good behaviour from the horse we have backed. Riek Machar is one of the very worst regional players (study his history from around 1991), and rightfully deserves to be banished from any role in the reconstruction of South Sudan, but his antagonist, President Salva Kiir, is not much better. We seem to have decided against Machar (which almost certainly throws us onto Kiir's side - it's almost impossible to be neutral in a situation like this), a position that is backed by all sides, including the UN. However, he leads a side that is just as corrupt, murderous and warlike as the other. The best outcome, everyone agrees, is for both Machar and Kiir (and the worst of their lieutenants) to leave the stage, but all our interventions seem to leave Kiir more entrenched. Worse, he has spat in our face. His government sent out a statement supporting Ban Ki-Moon's move on Lt. Gen. Ondieki, in effect rebuking Kenya.
Don't forget that we have leverage. Kenya (and Uganda) is the preferred bolthole for both sides. They each have family, homes and investments here. However, we seem not to want to bring these to bear for the outcomes that we want (I asked our Foreign Minister about that a few months ago, and she dodged the question - the video is below). We don't seem to want to squeeze the two sides in the manner that we can, and this leads them to thumb their noses at us, and to use Nairobi as the base for their international communications.
Remember the points I asked you to note a few minutes ago? Here's why: cast your mind back to Rwanda in 1994. Early in that tragic conflict, the Interahamwe deliberately sought out, tortured and killed Belgian troops under the UNAMIR banner. The aim, which they achieved, was to make the UN troops, or at least a significant proportion, leave the country, leaving the genocidaires room to carry out their dastardly act. I'm not saying that the delibate targeting and taunting of Americans in the July incident are a mirror of this, but the historical parallels are notable. Secondly, the biggest stain on Kofi Annan's stellar career in the UN came during his time as head of the DPKO. Again this was in Rwanda. The UN, and especially Annan, has rightly been castigated for standing aside as that genocide happened, and the DPKO must have had very uncomfortable flashbacks in July.
There is, unfortunately, no neat summary of all this, partly because the situation is still unfolding, and partly because the South Sudanese situation is so tragic on all sides. But it does help, as we sit here in Nairobi looking at the issues from some remove, to begin to understand them.
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